Abstract
One of the aspirations of political scientists and economists is to explain policy. Spatial models are a useful tool in this endeavour. In these models, policies typically depend on the preferences of the political actors. For example, the outcome of a legislative debate on deficit reduction can be expected to be different if all legislators favour spending cuts over tax hikes, as opposed to the other way around. The institutional rules also affect policies. They include such aspects of policy making as the legislative procedures and voting rules, the roles of the political actors, and the policy dimensions that are under consideration. If consensus rather than a simple majority is required, for example, agreeing on spending cuts is likely to be more difficult.
As in the study of legislative politics generally, spatial models have become a standard approach to study policy making in the European Union (EU). Steunenberg, Tsebelis, Crombez, Moser and Tsebelis and Garrett, amongst others, have presented spatial models of the EU legislative process. † Thomson et al. and Thomson have tested these and other theories. Spatial models have also been used to study other aspects of EU politics, albeit less often.
‡ The Commission appointment process, for example, has been formally analysed by Crombez and Hix. § In this paper we focus on legislative activity in the EU and the absence thereof, 'gridlock'. Legislative activity during a period of time is measured by the number of pieces of legislation that are adopted. We do not seek to explain what specific policies emerge from the political process, but rather we study under what conditions we can expect more or less legislative activity. These conditions relate to the two variables we mentioned above: actors' preferences, and institutional rules. † Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1994; Crombez 1996 Crombez , 1997 Crombez , 2001 Moser 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000 . ‡ Thomson et al. 2006; Thomson 2011 . § Crombez and Hix 2011. Our approach is similar to that used by Krehbiel to study United States law making. ** He found that legislative activity in the United States is a function of the width of the 'gridlock interval': the set of policies that cannot be changed in the legislative process, because the key political actors cannot agree under the institutional rules that are used. The status quo prevails if it is in the gridlock interval. † † If the adoption of a policy requires the approval of two political actors, for example, the gridlock interval is the set of policies that are located between the two actors' ideal policies. If the status quo is in this set, each actor wants to move policy closer to his ideal, and thus farther away from the other actor, and rejects moves away from his ideal. Gridlock then results. The gridlock interval can be considered as a measure for the preference heterogeneity of the key political actors in a particular period under given institutional rules. The more diverse their preferences, the wider the gridlock interval, and the less legislative activity occurs under the assumption that the status quo is uniformly distributed over the policy space.
Krehbiel further argued that the mood of the electorate and the government regime, divided or united, have no impact on legislative activity when controlling for the width of the gridlock interval. Our approach is similar, but what is of additional interest in the context of the EU are the changing procedural rules over the past three decades as a result of reforms of the EU Treaty.
We hence develop a theory of legislative activity and gridlock in the EU and test it using data on legislation and political actors' preferences for a thirty-year period, from 1979 until 2009. Gridlock in the EU has received little attention thus far in the literature. A related ** Krehbiel 1998 . † † The gridlock interval is distinct from, but related to the winset of the status quo. The winset is the set of policies that can beat the status quo in the legislative process. It is empty if the status quo is in the gridlock interval. We focus on the gridlock interval rather than the winset, because we are interested in the level of legislative activity. If the location of the status quo is uniformly distributed over the policy space, the relative size of the gridlock interval measures for what proportion of status quos no legislative activity occurs. By contrast, the size of the winset does not give any indication of the extent of legislative activity, beyond whether there can be legislative activity for a specific status quo or not.
concept, the duration of the EU legislative process, has garnered more interest. ‡ ‡ Golub analysed the speed of EU decision-making and argued that the Treaty reforms of the 80s and 90s did not shorten the duration of the legislative process. § § He pointed at the mediating influence of the distribution of preferences. Schulz and König also studied decision-making efficiency and found, by contrast, that the EU managed to reform its procedures to handle an expanding legislative agenda.
*** Hertz and Leuffen studied the impact of enlargement on the production of legislation in the EU and found that the effect was smaller than they expected. † † † Others analysed the impact of enlargement on the speed of EU decision making. ‡ ‡ ‡ König found that a rise in the level of conflict in the Council, as measured by the distance between the policy positions of the two most extreme member states, increased the duration of the EU's legislative process. § § §
What is different about our approach is that rather than focus on the speed of the adoption of legislation, which has been extensively studied in existing research on EU legislative politics, we focus on the volume of legislation adopted in a particular period.
Moreover, we study the combined effect of procedures and preferences on legislative activity during a thirty-year period. Put simply: does a larger (smaller) gridlock interval reduce (increase) legislative output? Our theory predicts that it does. What is more, our theory suggests that the institutional rules and the political actors' preferences do not affect legislative activity beyond the impact they have on the gridlock interval.
In the next section we present our model of legislative activity in the EU. In the third section we analyse how preferences and institutions affect this activity. We then test our ‡ ‡ While the two concepts are related, the duration of the legislative process cannot be considered as a measure of gridlock. An institutional reform that adds a stage to the legislative process, for example, may extend its duration without reducing legislative output. Conversely, the reform of a voting rule may lead to more output without having an impact on the duration of the process. 
A Model of Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the EU
In this section we present a model of legislative activity in the EU, which builds on models of EU policy making introduced by Crombez. † † † †
Pivotal Actors and Procedural Rules
The political actors in the model are the m member states, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), and the Commissioners. We assume that these actors care about policy and have Euclidean preferences. That is, they have ideal policies and prefer policies that are closer to rather than farther away from these ideal policies. Thus, they can be represented by points in an n-dimensional policy space P⊂ℜ n .
Since has an ideal policy to the left (right) of the member state with the median vote. In particular, ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ Multi-dimensional models of policy making would lead to similar conclusions. Commission proposals would need to satisfy the same conditions to be adopted. The analysis would be more intricate, however, because the pivotal member states, MEPs and Commissioners would be different depending on the direction of policy change considered. There would thus be more relevant actors. The graphical representation of multidimensional models of policy making would also be more complicated. For the purposes of our analysis no additional insights would be gained, however. § § § § The Commission typically tries to reach consensus, but uses simple majority rule if it fails to reach consensus. The prospect of a simple majority vote, and the preference configuration, thus determine consensus agreements. The European Parliament uses absolute majority rule in some instances. A majority of its members then need to vote in favor rather than a mere majority of the voting members. Participation rates have increased over the years, however, and as this trend continues the absolute majority requirement becomes equivalent to a simple majority rule (e.g. Hix et al. 2007 The preferences of the political actors are also exogenously assigned at the start of each period. The actors' preferences may be different from those in the previous period because political actors may have been voted out of office and replaced, for example. We assume for simplicity that in period t political actors care about policy during that period only.
They do not care about policy in future periods.
The location of the status quo at the start of period 1 is exogenously given. The location of the status quo at the start of period t>1 depends on the policy that was set in period t-1 and an exogenous shock that may have moved its location at the start of period t. At the start of period t an exogenous shock S occurs with probability π. Approval by a qualified majority in the Council is required for adoption. If the proposal is adopted, it becomes EU law. Otherwise the status quo prevails. Figure 1 shows the sequence of events under consultation. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ In reality codecision starts with a Commission proposal. We ignore the first steps of the procedure, however, as they are irrelevant for the purpose of determining the gridlock interval, because the European Parliament can disregard them when it proposes its joint text. Also, we assume that only the European Parliament can propose a joint text, whereas member states can do so too in reality. This assumption does not affect our conclusions either, because it does not affect the gridlock interval.
MS k may propose an amendment.
The MSs vote on the (amended) proposal (by qualified majority).
The Commission formulates a proposal.
The MSs vote on the amendment (by unanimity).
MS = Member State
The EP proposes a joint text.
The MSs vote on the joint text (by qualified majority).
The model incorporates complete and perfect information. We use the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium concept.
Legislative Activity and Gridlock
We next look at the conditions under which the EU manages to adopt legislation in period t under each of the two main legislative procedures of the EU: consultation and co-decision.
Under consultation the Commission needs the support of a qualified majority in the Council for the adoption of its proposal in the last step of the procedure. The Commission then focuses on the relevant pivotal member state, since any proposal which wins its support can be adopted in the Council. If the Commission wants to move to the right (left) the relevant pivotal member state is member state a (b). The Commission thus only considers the policies that this member state prefers to the status quo. Not all proposals that are preferred to the status quo by the relevant pivotal member state make it to the last step of the procedure, however, because they can be amended by unanimity in the second and third steps of the procedure. Such proposals that are to the left or right of the ideal policies of all member states are successfully amended, and the amended proposal will be between the ideal policies of the two extreme member states. When formulating its proposal in the first step of the procedure the Commission thus considers the policies that are preferred to the status quo by the relevant pivotal member state and that are between the ideal policies of the two extreme member states. The Commission successfully proposes the policy it prefers most from this set of policies.
So, under what circumstances does consultation lead to gridlock? Proposals need to be preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority for adoption. If no policy is preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority, the status quo prevails. If the status quo is to the right (left) of member state a (b), there is no qualified majority in favour of a move to the right (left). 
Determinants of Gridlock
As discussed, our theory suggests that equilibrium policies depend on two main factors:
actors' preferences, and institutional rules. We now analyse how these factors affect gridlock.
Actors' Preferences
In the previous section we determined the gridlock intervals for an issue in period t under consultation and co-decision. Under consultation, the gridlock interval widens as the pivotal member states are farther apart, and as the extreme member states and the Commission are farther away from the midpoint between the two pivotal member states' ideal policies. Under co-decision, meanwhile, the gridlock interval expands as the pivotal member states are farther apart, and as the European Parliament is farther away from the midpoint between the two pivotal member states' ideal policies. More preference heterogeneity thus hinders legislative activity on an issue under both consultation and co-decision.
At the start of each period the Commission considers on what issues legislative activity is possible. It then studies the equilibrium policies that will emerge on these issues, and the utility it will derive from those policies. It chooses the issue that yields the largest utility increase, or smallest utility decrease, for itself. ****** The only difference is that a change in one member state's preferences may result in more than one pivotal or extreme member state having different preferences. For example, if the most leftist member state moves all the way to the other extreme, the preferences of both extreme member states are different after the change, and the preferences of both pivotal member states may be different as well. Note: Changes to the decision-making rules in the Commission, the Council, or the EP are indicated in bold. Consultation (U) is the consultation procedure with unanimity in the Council. Consultation (Q) is the is the consultation procedure with QMV in the Council. 
Changes to Institutional Rules

Empirical Analysis
To test these ideas we developed a method for calculating the size of the gridlock interval in the EU legislative institutions in a particular period, and then looked at the relationship between the size of this interval and the number of EU laws adopted. Formally, in our theory the location of the status quo on a particular policy issue, and whether this point is inside or outside the gridlock interval, should predict whether the policy can or cannot be changed in a particular period. One possible empirical operationalization of this would be to look at the location of policy status quos in a particular period, and to see whether these policies are moved into the gridlock interval. Such an operationalization is very difficult in any context.
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There are also good reasons why the volume of legislation in a particular period is a reasonable way of testing our theory in the EU context.
First, because much of the data we are looking at relates to new EU policies and the building of the single market, policy status quos are not likely to be limited to particular parts of the policy space, which are then freed-up when the gridlock interval changes. Existing policy status quos are likely to be reasonably evenly distributed on a left-right dimension, because some EU policies lead to de-regulation of existing standards whereas other policies lead to the adoption of new regulatory standards.
Second, because of the way EU decision-making works and because of the different electoral timetables of the member states and institutions, it is impossible to identify a period in EU politics where the gridlock interval is fixed for a sufficiently long period of time for all existing policies outside this interval to be moved into the interval. Specifically, it would not To calculate the size of the gridlock interval in a six-month period we proceeded as follows. First, we identified the main decision-making rules that apply in each six-month period, as described above and in Table 1 . In most of these periods, several different rules are used at the same time. For example, during the period of the SEA, the cooperation and the consultation procedure were used for different policy issues, and under the period of the Maastricht Treaty, the co-decision and consultation procedures were used for different policy issues. Also, in most periods, some legislation is adopted by unanimity in the Council while other legislation is adopted by qualified-majority voting, depending on the legislative procedure. 23 In each 6-month period the EU adopts many laws under a variety of different legislative procedures. However, we decided to use a simple aggregate measure of the total number of legislative acts adopted as we felt that any decision regarding what to count or not to count as a legislative act adopted under the procedure we focus on in a particular period would be relatively arbitrary. As a result, because our dependent variable is a 'noisy' indicator, our results are likely to be at the lower bound of statistical significance. 24 Häge 2011. See http://frankhaege.eu/data/eupol. 25 König et al. 2006 . The König et al. data are more complete than Häge's data on issues like the voting procedure used in the Council on a particular legislative issue. However, this difference between the two datasets is not relevant for our research because we only use the datasets to measure the number of pieces of legislation adopted in each six-month period.
To test our model, though, we need to make an assumption about the main procedural rules used in each period, and we use the procedures as shown in Table 1 . As a robustness check, we also test whether the results hold if we assume that cooperation rather than consultation was the main procedure during the period of the SEA. Nevertheless, by making this assumption, we introduce a certain measurement error, which reduces the likelihood that we will find significant results.
Second, having identified the procedures used in each six-month period, which in turn determines the pivotal actors under each procedure, we then calculated the location of each of the actors. Here, again, we make a simplifying assumption, and assume that these actors are located on a left-right policy dimension. This is not an unreasonable simplification. Thomson et al. 2004 Thomson et al. , 2006 Thomson 2011; Zimmer et al. 2005. which suggests that it is reasonable to assume that politicians' preferences on many EU policies (such as environmental standards or social standards) are influenced by their underlying left-right policy preferences. Yet, if EU policy-making is in fact multidimensional, assuming that it is one-dimensional introduces measurement error, which hence reduces the likelihood that we will find significant results by making this simplifying assumption.
To Parliament and the right pivotal government in the Council or the European Parliament. As a robustness check we also calculate gridlock intervals for the period after the Maastricht Treaty assuming that the Commission had gatekeeping power. In this case, the gridlock interval in this period was as under the cooperation procedure. So, in the hypothetical example in Figure   3 , the gridlock interval under the co-decision procedure without Commission gatekeeping is the distance between p a and p p , and under the co-decision procedure with Commission gatekeeping is the distance between p c and p p .
Finally, in the statistical analysis we include a number of control variables that are often broached to influence the volume of legislation adopted by the EU in a given period. As policy competences of the EU as a result of each of these treaty reforms. Related to this, our theory predicts that legislative activity decreases over time, but that the deepening of the EU that results from the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty leads to an increase in EU legislation.
Descriptive statistics for all the variables are shown in the Appendix.
Results
To get a sense of some of the patterns in the data, Figure 4 1979h1 1980h1 1981h1 1982h1 1983h1 1984h1 1985h1 1986h1 1987h1 1988h1 1989h1 1990h1 1991h1 1992h1 1993h1 1994h1 1995h1 1996h1 1997h1 1998h1 1999h1 1980h1  1981h1  1982h1  1983h1  1984h1  1985h1  1986h1  1987h1  1988h1  1989h1  1990h1  1991h1  1992h1  1993h1  1994h1  1995h1  1996h1  1997h1  1998h1  1999h1  2000h1  2001h1  2002h1  2003h1  2004h1  2005h1  2006h1  2007h1  2008h1  2009h1 Period Table 2 presents the main results. 36 The size of the gridlock interval is statistically significant in all model specifications. Specifically, the bigger the gridlock interval, the less legislation the EU has passed. In model 1, for example, the size of the gridlock interval alone explains about 18 per cent of the variance in the volume of legislation adopted by the EU. In addition, a one-unit increase in the size of the gridlock interval (measured on a 10-point scale)
corresponds to 14 fewer pieces of legislation passed by the EU in a six-month period. As model 2 shows, moreover, the size of the gridlock interval remains significant even when controlling for the changes to the decision-making rules, as represented by the SEA and Maastricht+ variables. Adding these two dummy variables controls for all periods after the extension of QMV in the Single European Act. Even with these variables included, a larger gridlock interval leads to fewer legislative acts adopted. Also, as models 3, 4 and 5 show, dropping one or other of the three institutional periods does not affect the general result. In 36 We present OLS regression results for ease of interpretation of the results. As a robustness check, we also estimated the models in Tables 2, 3 and 4 with negative binomial regression, and the results are identical.
other words, changes in the size of the gridlock interval within in each institutional period influences, as a result of the changing policy positions of the pivotal actors in the EU institutions, influences the volume of legislation adopted by the EU. Table 3 shows the same models, but this time with the full set of control variables.
Model 1, from Table 2 , is included here for comparison. As model 6 shows, the size of the gridlock interval is still highly significant, and the magnitude of the effect hardly changes, despite controlling for a number of other factors. Dropping each period separately only affects the results when the Rome period is dropped. However, if the No. of member states variable is excluded, the gridlock interval is then significant even when Rome is excluded. This is because the number of member states is moderately correlated (at 0.49) with the size of the gridlock interval after the move to QMV in 1987. Regarding the other variables, the difference between the first and second halves of a year is not significant. Also, less legislation tended to be adopted when one of the big member states held the Council Presidency, although this is not significant in all models. In contrast, more laws have been adopted towards the end of a term of the European Parliament, at least since the SEA. Furthermore, since the SEA higher public support for the EU had correlated with more legislative action, as others have found. Third, models 12 and 13 look at two alternative conceptions of the operation of the legislative rules. Model 12 assumes that most legislation in the period of the SEA was adopted by the cooperation procedure, while model 13 assumes that the Commission had a gatekeeping right under the co-decision procedure. These different assumptions, which lead to slightly different ways of measuring the size of the gridlock intervals since the SEA, produce identical results to the main results in Tables 2 and 3. Model 14 tests König's approach, which focuses only on the level of conflict in the Council, by assuming that the gridlock interval is the distance between the policy positions of the two pivotal governments in the Council. 38 The basic result holds: that the size of the gridlock interval -in the Council only, this time -is negatively related to the number of legislative acts adopted in a six-month period. Interestingly, though, the magnitude of the coefficient on the gridlock interval variable is smaller in model 14 than in models 6, 12, and 13, which are the alternative definitions of the gridlock interval which include the locations and powers of the European Parliament and/or Commission. This suggests that the preferences of the EU's supranational institutions do influence EU legislative outcomes over and above the preferences of the pivotal member states in the Council. This is an interesting 37 Warntjen et al. 2008 . 38 König 2007. result given the fact that the European Parliament and/or the Commission were located outside the interval between the two pivotal member states in the Council in only 19 of the 60 periods we look at, as Figure 1 shows. The results suggest, though, that this was enough to make a difference. Put another way, less legislation was adopted in the early 1990s because the median MEP was to the left of the pivotal governments in the Council (under QMV) than would have been the case had the European Parliament not had power under the co-decision procedure.
Finally, model 15 looks at the effect of the gridlock interval on the volume of legislation proposed by the Commission. The result suggests that the Commission is strategic when considering legislative proposals, in that it proposed less (more) legislation when the gridlock interval was larger (smaller). However, the magnitude of the relationship between the size of the gridlock interval and the volume of legislation proposed is smaller than the magnitude of the relationship between the size of the gridlock interval and the volume of legislation adopted. Interestingly, though, the results on some of the control variables are different in this model than in the other models. Particularly, whereas the effect of the European Parliament election cycle influences the volume of legislation adopted it has no effect on the volume of legislation proposed. Also, whereas a big member state holding the Council Presidency has a negative effect on the volume of legislation adopted, a big member state holding the Council Presidency has a positive effect on the volume of legislation proposed, although these results are not statistically significant.
Conclusion
Intuitively one might think that enlargement of the EU from 6 to 27 member states and changes to the procedural rules which have added the European Parliament as a veto-player have made it more difficult for the EU to adopt policy. Our theory challenges these intuitions.
As in other multi-actor legislative environments, such as the United States presidential system or in coalition governments in parliamentary systems, the ability to adopt legislation depends on the preferences of the key actors, the rules governing the relative powers of these actors, and the location of existing polices. These factors together determine the size of the set of policies that can be moved, and conversely the size of the set of policies that cannot be moved: the gridlock interval. In our approach, the number of actors or the decision-making rules only affect policy outcomes in so far as they influence the relative size of the gridlock interval.
In the EU context, for example, the shift from consultation to the co-decision Our empirical analysis of EU legislative activity between 1979 and 2009 supports this perspective. We find compelling evidence that as the gridlock interval in the EU increased (decreased) from one six-month period to the next, the legislative activity of the EU decreased (increased). For example, a decline in the size of the gridlock interval in the late 1990s, as a result of a shift to the centre-left across the EU at that time, corresponded to an increase in the legislative activity in the EU. Then, in the early 2000s, as the EU Council became more heterogeneous as centre-right governments began to be elected and following the election of a centre-right majority in the European Parliament, the gridlock interval increased and the legislative activity of the EU consequently declined.
Moreover, these results are perhaps surprising given the simplification assumptions we need to make in the empirical estimation -about the uni-dimensionality of EU politics and the use of a single main legislative procedure in each period. Given the inevitable errors in the measurement of our key independent variable which result from these simplifications, the magnitude of our key results are probably at the lower bound of the true relationship between gridlock size and EU legislative outputs.
Finally, our theory also suggests that the EU should adopt particular types of policies in particular periods. So, if the pivotal actors are close together on the centre-left, as they were in the late 1990s, the EU should not only adopt more policy, but should also move existing policy status quos in a leftward direction. Conversely, if the pivotal actors are close together on the centre-right, as they were in the late 2000s, the EU should once again adopt more policy than in the early 2000s when the gridlock interval was larger, but should also move existing policy status quos in a rightward direction. Hence, building on our theory and evidence, future research could look at how the substantive content of EU policy has changed over time in response to the size of the gridlock interval and the preferences of the key actors.
